This paper develops and empirically tests a model designed to distinguish the role of real and …nancing frictions on …rms'investment, debt …nancing and equity …nancing policies. Real frictions include …xed costs of investment and adjustment costs. Financing frictions include taxes, collateral constraints, ‡otation costs of equity and dividend constraints. Because of …nancing frictions, all corporate policies are interrelated and depend on average Q. Due to …xed costs of investment and binding …nancing constraints, the sensitivity of corporate policies to Q is non-linear. The empirical tests demonstrate that both the endogeneity and non-linearities created by real and …nancing frictions are economically signi…cant. The model then relates the e¤ects of real and …-nancing frictions on corporate policies to stock returns. The paper provides a rationale for the documented poor performance of Q-theory in explaining investment, and for the di¤erential performance of the neoclassical investment model in explaining investment and stock returns. The paper extends Q-theory to explain debt and equity issues, and shows that market to book sorts control for non-linearities in investment policies.
Introduction
The neoclassical investment model usually referred to as the Q-theory of investment constitutes a benchmark in …nancial economics to explain …rm behavior. Its empirical performance, however, is controversial. Caballero (1997) documents poor performance of Q-theory to explain investment both in the aggregate and in the cross section. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Hennessy (2004) show that average Q is not a su¢ cient statistic by showing that cash ‡ows and debt overhang e¤ects are also signi…cant in explaining investment. Meanwhile, Cochrane (1991 Cochrane ( , 1996 shows that a factor pricing model for stock returns based on the same theory of investment is not rejected both in the cross section and over time. 1 More recently, Philippon (2007) shows that Q-theory also performs well in explaining bond yields. Several questions arise from these facts and motivate this paper. First, why does the same model perform poorly in explaining investment but quite successfully in explaining stock returns? Second, what is the relation between investment, …nancing and stock returns in the context of Q-theory? Finally, why does the neoclassical model of investment explain bond behavior in the time series? This paper provides a uni…ed framework to answer these questions by modelling and testing empirically the e¤ects of both real and …nancing frictions on …rms'optimal investment, debt …nancing and equity …nancing policies.
The core of the paper builds on two main observations concerning the e¤ect of real and …nancing frictions on …rms' corporate policies. Real frictions include …xed costs of investment and adjustment costs. Financing frictions include taxes, ‡otation costs of equity, collateral constraints and dividend constraints. The …rst observation is that in the presence of …nancing frictions the optimal investment and …nancing policies of the …rm are interrelated and depend on average Q. The second observation is that both …xed costs of investment and binding …nancing frictions create optimal inaction regions in corporate policies. The main contribution is to estimate all corporate policies and to show that both the endogeneity and non-linearities caused by real and …nancing frictions are economically signi…cant. The paper then introduces an exogenous pricing kernel and relates the …ndings on corporate policies to stock returns. The di¤erences between the empirical approach in this paper and that of the empirical literature on Q-theory provide a potential answer as to why the same model has been successful in explaining stock returns but not investment policies.
The paper highlights that the estimation of the sensitivity of investment to Q is biased if the empirical approach fails to account for the e¤ect of real and …nancing frictions on investment. The fact that coe¢ cients on average Q have been typically low or insigni…cant surveyed by Caballero (1997) implies that Q-theory has been tested on average, neglecting the role of …nancing and the lumpiness in investment policies. In a frictionless environment with quadratic adjustment costs, Hayashi (1982) posits average Q as a su¢ cient statistic for investment. Due to real and …nancing frictions, this paper shows that investment is sensitive to Q and additional …nancing variables in the active region of investment, and insensitive to Q in the inertia region. The interaction between optimal investment and …nancing policies requires the use of instruments to control for endogeneity. The existence of inertia regions requires the use of sorts to test the sensitivity of investment to Q only when …rms are actively investing. Since …rms optimally invest conditional on marginal q; market to book equity ratios sort for inertia regions of investment in all equity …nanced, unconstrained …rms. Given the link between stock returns and investment returns observed by Cochrane (1991) and Restoy and Rockinger (1994) , the main observations concerning the e¤ect of real and …nancing frictions on corporate policies then translate into stock returns. In the presence of …nancing frictions, the returns to investment are endogenously related to the returns to …nancing. Furthermore, the lumpiness in investment policies due to …xed costs of investment results in non-linearity between stock returns and market to book ratios. In the empirical estimation, the …rst observation requires the use of instruments to control for the changing …nancing costs of funding investment opportunities. The second observation requires the use of sorts to control for inertia regions of investment in stock returns.
The paper then suggests one reason why Q-theory has historically performed better for stock returns is that the empirical approach in the investment based asset pricing literature has used both instruments and sorts on market to book, naturally controlling for the impact of real and …nancing frictions on …rm behavior. The standard conditional estimation applied by Cochrane (1996) and Liu, Whited and Zhang (2007) uses default premia, dividend yields and term premia as instruments for the estimation of stock returns. I argue that these instruments control for changes in …rms'costs of funding investment. The sorts by market to book equity introduced by French (1992, 1993) have been used in the empirical asset pricing literature to control for sample heterogeneity and ease the dimensionality problem of portfolio analysis. This paper shows that sorts by market to book control for non linearities in investment policies.
The model predicts multiple regimes in all corporate policies depending on whether …nancing constraints are binding and …rms are actively investing. Concerning optimal investment policies, the empirical estimation focuses on three main results. First, controlling for …nancing frictions, …xed costs of investment create an optimal inaction region in which investment is insensitive to Q. Second, in the active region of investment, investment is relatively insensitive to Q when …rms are subject to collateral constraints, and/or jointly subject to binding dividend and share repurchase requirements. Abel and Eberly (1994) and Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2006) obtain similar results in frameworks that respectively con…ne attention to real and …nancing frictions. The novelty of the model presented here is to incorporate both. This leads to a third novel prediction: …nancing frictions induce a larger inertia region for positive investment than that predicted by Abel and Eberly's neoclassical framework. This o¤ers a complementary rationale for the insensitivity of investment to average Q in empirical tests.
Financing frictions thus induce underinvestment in two alternative ways. In the active region of investment, investment is relatively insensitive to Q when …rms are subject to binding …nancing constraints. In the inactive region of investment, this paper shows that …nancing frictions may also induce underinvestment by enlarging the inertia region of optimal investment policies. In particular, …rms subject to binding collateral constraints or dividend constraints require a higher marginal product of capital to reinitiate investment. Given reversibility in investment policies, the model further shows that …nancing frictions a¤ect the incentives of …rms to postpone disinvestment.
The model also provides testable implications for the optimal equity and debt …nancing policies as a function of Q. The empirical estimation focuses on three main results for …nancing policies. First, controlling for real and binding …nancing frictions, both equity and …nancing policies are positively and signi…cantly related to average Q. Given that both investment and …nancing policies contribute to …rm value, all corporate policies are interrelated and depend on average Q. Second, equity issues are sensitive to Q when …rms are not …nancially constrained and are in their active region of investment. Firms with no equity issuance (due to high costs of equity funding) and no payout to shareholders (due to lack of internal resources) are …nancially constrained and should have low coe¢ cients on Q. Finally, a novel prediction is that lumpy real investment may induce lumpy debt issuance due to binding collateral constraints. In the model, a …rm lacking su¢ cient collateral to increase its debt …nancing is more severely constrained to re…nance when it is optimal not to invest. This causal mechanism is distinct from that modeled by Tserlukevich (2008) , whose theory of debt lumpiness hinges upon the debt tax shield. My paper hinges upon credit rationing cum lumpy real policies.
The empirical tests control for both the endogeneity and non linearities in corporate policies using the linear GMM generalized instrumental approach. To assess the endogeneity between investment and …nancing, I estimate corporate policies using linear GMM and use all lagged regressors as instrumental variables. This is in line with and Hansen and Singleton (1982) . I also cluster data by …rm history and include lagged changes in retained earnings, lagged changes in working capital, year dummies and industry dummies. To control for non-linearities, I sort the sample into quantiles to identify alternative regimes in corporate policies. In the case of investment, the sorting criterion builds on the prediction that marginal q equals market to book ratios plus additional variables controlling for the shadow costs of …nancing. The empirical section considers a double sort on market to book ratios and the net resources of the …rm before investing; the working assumption is that these two variables jointly proxy for the levered marginal q determining inaction regions. The sorting criteria applied to debt and equity …nancing policies also build on the optimality conditions of the model to identify responsiveness to marginal q, binding collateral constraints and binding dividend constraints.
The empirical evidence for a sample of US industrial …rms between 1980 and 2005 suggests that the both endogeneity and non-linearities described in the model are economically signi…cant. Concerning endogeneity, the coe¢ cient on Q estimated under linear GMM is usually higher than the one obtained under OLS; the sign and signi…cance of the remaining coe¢ cients in all corporate policies also changes. Consistent with the model, the endogeneity between investment and …nancing is further demonstrated by the fact that both debt and equity issues are signi…cantly related to average Q in the sample.
Concerning non-linearities, the empirical evidence complements Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) and suggests the existence of inaction regions in investment policies. Investment is usually insensitive to Q when market to book equity ratios are su¢ ciently low; this matches the prediction that positive investment optimally occurs once the marginal product of capital exceeds a lower bound. 2 The empirical evidence also suggests that …nancially constrained …rms postpone investment to a higher marginal product of capital. When …rms are …nancially constrained, the coe¢ cient on Q is only signi…cantly related to investment for higher market to book ratios. Furthermore, …rms with higher net funding resources have higher coe¢ cients on Q in their active region of investment. The estimation results for debt and equity …nancing policies also support the prediction that …nancing depends positively on average Q: Consistent with the model, the responsiveness of Q to positive debt and equity issues is non-linear and depends on the inaction regions of investment and binding …nancing constraints.
The last section of the paper relates the …ndings on corporate policies to stock returns by incorporating an exogenous pricing kernel to the basic model. I show that binding …nanc-ing constraints reduce …rm value and increase market betas. This provides an alternative testable implication on the role of …nancing frictions on …rm value. Stock returns depend on price-earnings e¤ects, equity issues, market to book, changes in leverage, idiosyncratic risk, and a market premium for aggregate risk. These …ndings are consistent with both empirical studies on the cross section of stock returns as well as with theoretical models discussing these regularities. 3 The model then contributes in showing that the lumpiness in investment policies a¤ects the sensitivity of stock returns to marginal q: The paper predicts that the usual market to book sorts applied by the empirical asset pricing literature have economic content; they control for the non-linear sensitivity of stock returns with respect to q:
The paper thus contributes to the current literature of Q-theory and …nancing frictions in several dimensions. First, it provides a benchmark model of investment and …nancing with testable implications on all corporate policies as a function of Q. The model elaborates on the link between real and …nancing frictions: binding collateral constraints propagate lumpiness between investment and debt …nancing, and the inertia region of investment shifts due to binding …nancing constraints. Second, the paper provides an empirical approach to test optimal corporate policies in the presence of both endogeneity and non linearities between corporate policies and Q. Finally, the paper suggests an economic rationale for the use of sorts in the empirical investment based asset pricing literature, and proposes an explanation to the di¤erential performance of the neoclassical investment model for stock returns and corporate policies.
The paper is related to several strands of the …nancial economics literature. First, the paper relates to the macro papers on Q-theory for all equity …nanced …rms. Hayashi (1982) derives the frictionless case and …rst tests the model empirically; Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996) consider alternative adjustment cost functions and discuss the role of …xed costs; Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) test empirically the non-linearity of investment for all equity …nanced …rms; Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997), and Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999) argue that non-convexities and irreversibility play a central role in the investment process. Second, the paper relates to the literature of …nancing frictions. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) provide empirical evidence on the investment-cash ‡ow sensitivity; Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) test the Euler condition for investment for constrained …rms; Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2006) consider endogenous …nancing without …xed investment costs. This paper merges both strands of literature and highlights the role of …xed costs of investment policies in all corporate policies of the …rm; it further proposes an alternative empirical approach to that of Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) and Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2006) to estimate all corporate policies in the presence of real and …nancing frictions.
The predictions of the model also relate to other papers in the investments and real options literature. Lamont (2000) suggests that time to build a¤ects the link between investment and marginal q; this paper also highlights that the observed investment rates are not necessarily matched by the optimality condition of investment. De Marzo et al (2007) predict in a model of agency that investment is relatively insensitive to average Q when the …rm is …nancially constrained; this paper yields a similar prediction in an alternative framework. Philippon (2007) suggests that Q-theory performs well in explaining bond yields in the time series, this paper highlights the interaction between investment and …nancing. Tserlukevich (2008) explores the e¤ect of tax yields and …xed costs of investment for optimal debt policies; this paper shows that binding collateral constraints propagate lumpiness from real to …nancing policies. Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2005a) and Novy-Marx (2007) discuss the role of operating leverage for stock returns; this paper also elaborates on the role of …xed costs, primarily for corporate policies.
Finally, the paper relates to the investment based asset pricing literature. Cochrane (1991) and Restoy and Rockinger (1994) provide the link between investment returns and stock returns. Yaron, Gomes and Zhang (2002) , Obreja (2006) and Gomes and Schmid (2007) further assess the link between investment and …nancing decisions for stock returns. This paper highlights the impact of …xed costs of investment on the sensitivity of stock returns to marginal q. The model also relates to Berk, Green and Naik (1999) and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2005a) who derive implications for the cross section in a partial equilibrium set-up.
The paper is divided in …ve sections. Section 2 describes the main set-up. Section 3 discusses both the testable implications for corporate policies and the asset pricing implications of the model. Section 4 includes the empirical estimation of the testable implications for corporate policies in Section 3. Section 5 relates the results in Section 4 to the investment based asset pricing literature. Section 6 concludes.
The Model

The Problem of the Firm
Consider a …rm run by a manager who decides on its optimal investment, external equity and debt …nancing policies. The manager maximizes the market value of the existing shares. The model distinguishes between the initial shareholders and the new shareholders incorporated through subsequent external equity …nancing issues. Investors are risk neutral and discount cash ‡ows at a constant risk free rate r > 0: 4 The gross operating pro…ts of the …rm denoted by F (K t ; t ) are a function of the current capital stock K t and some diversi…able shocks t . The …rm is a price-taker and its production function exhibits constant returns to scale, such that its gross pro…ts F are linear in capital. The function F is also twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in all its arguments. The state variable t captures innovations in both input and output prices, and evolves according to a di¤usion process
where W t is a standard Wiener process. Capital is acquired by undertaking gross investment at a rate I t , and the capital stock depreciates as a …xed proportional rate k : The capital stock K t then evolves according to
When the …rm undertakes gross investment, it incurs di¤erent types of costs. First, the …rm incurs a direct cost of purchase of capital. I set the price of capital equal to 1 such that this cost is equal to I t : Second, the …rm incurs both adjustment costs and …xed costs of investment given by
The …rst term of G represents the costs of adjusting plant and equipment and is quadratic and homogeneous of degree one in both I t and K t . The second term of G represents …xed costs of investment, where I t is an indicator function for non-zero investment. The …xed costs of investment l (K t ) are such that G(I t ; K t ) are an homogeneous function of I and K. 5 4 More precisely, r is the constant yield of a tax exempt risk free bond. 5 In line with Abel and Eberly (1994) , …xed costs do not a¤ect the rescaling property of S. Davis and Norman (1990) and Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007) consider alternative set-ups where …xed costs break down the homogeneity of the value function.
The …rm has multiple sources of external …nancing, and each of these sources is subject to di¤erent …nancing frictions. Concerning debt …nancing, the …rm has access to a credit line
where b t measures new bank borrowing or reductions in the debt bu¤er stock, the endogenous state variable B t denotes the credit line balance. A debt covenant given by dB t dK t where =
ensures that the credit line is risk-free. The debt covenant ensures that new debt …nancing is backed by new investment projects. 6 Firms are subject to corporate taxes that yield a tax bene…t of debt. I consider a tax bene…t function J(b t ; B t ) showing decreasing marginal tax bene…ts of debt as documented empirically by Graham (2000) . Graham (2000) documents that the tax function is generally ‡at for small interest deductions but, because tax rates fall as interest expense increases, eventually becomes downward sloping. 7 A reduced functional form for the tax bene…ts of debt that is in line with these observations is given by
where c is the average marginal tax rate on corporate income and re ‡ects the curvature of the tax bene…ts of debt. Alternatively, Bond and Meghir (1994) and Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2006) consider a convex interest schedule on the debt obligations that is increasing in book leverage. This alternative approach yields similar results as those obtained with (4). 8 The …rm may also fund its investment by means of new external equity funding x t : Following Hayashi (1985) , the …rm cannot execute share repurchases such that x t > 0: Equity issues are subject to convex ‡otation costs of underwriting as documented by Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) . The function for ‡otation costs of equity issues H t is assumed to be
The costs of raising external equity thus cause the …rm to retain funds in order to reduce reliance on external equity …nancing. 6 This covenant is stronger than the one implied by Bt Kt: The covenant in this paper facilitates the analysis to obtain testable implications in Section 4.
7 Interest deductions reduce taxable income, which decreases the probability that a …rm will be fully taxable in all current and future states, which in turn reduces the tax bene…t from incremental deductions. 8 Note that a convex interest rate increasing in the credit line balance combined with a linear tax schedule yields concave tax bene…ts of debt.
The budget constraint of then …rm is then given by
where D t are the dividends to shareholders. The …rst two terms on the right-hand side of (6) represent the gross operating pro…ts of the …rm net of depreciation and related investment costs. The last two terms on the right hand side of (6) represent external sources of funds due to both debt …nancing and equity issues net of ‡otation costs. Dividends to shareholders D t are subject to both personal taxes and taxes on capital gains upon realization. I denote m < 1 the index of the stock market's preference for capital gains income over dividend income (Hayashi, 1985) . 9 The initial shareholders of the …rm further require D t > D such that there is a lower bound to the dividends they receive (Gomes, Yaron and Zhang, 2006) . Without loss of generality, I consider D = 0 throughout the paper.
The vector (K t ; B t ; t ) captures all the relevant information at each instant t. At each point in time, the manager chooses the optimal investment I t and the …nancing policies b t and x t that maximize the value of existing shares S t . In sum, the manager maximizes the value of current equity holdings such that S(K t ; B t ; t ) = max bt;It;xt
subject to (1), (2), (3), (6) and the constraints dB t dK t ; D t > 0 and x t > 0: The term x t in (7) re ‡ects the dilution of the market value of existing shares at time t. The corresponding Bellman Equation for the optimization problem of the manager in (7) is then given by
subject to the collateral constraints on the credit line ' [dB dK] = 0 and the nonnegativity constraints D = 0 and x = 0; where ', and are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers of these constraints.
Optimal Investment Policies
Denote the marginal product of capital by q S K . Using the approach in Abel and Eberly (1994) , the investment policy that maximizes (8) in the presence of …xed costs of investment 9 At the personal level, dividends are taxed at a constant rate p: Capital gains are taxed at rate g upon realization. Then m < 1 denotes the stock market's preference for capital gains income over dividend income such that m = and …nancing constraints is given by
where the cut-o¤ values q 1 < 0 and q 2 > 0 on the marginal product of capital determine an optimal inaction region for investment. The optimal policy in (9) encompasses optimal investment rules discussed elsewhere in the literature and provides new insights on the role of …nancing frictions on investment. When …rms are not subject to any type of …xed costs ([q 1 ; q 2 ] = ?) or …nancing constraints (' = 0; = 0 and = 0), the optimal investment policy is a continuous function of the marginal product of capital and q is a su¢ cient statistic for investment (Hayashi, 1982) . When all equity …nanced …rms are subject to …xed costs of adjustment ([q 1 ; q 2 ] 6 = ?), Abel and Eberly (1994) show that the optimal investment policy is non-linear in q since there is a non-degenerate inaction region where …rms …nd it optimal not to invest. 10 Binding …nancing constraints a¤ect the responsiveness of investment to marginal q in two alternative ways. All else equal, in the active region investment is relatively insensitive to q when the …rm is …nancially constrained. Conversely, investment is sensitive to q when the …rm is not subject to binding …nancial constraints. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Binding dividend constraints ( > 0) dampen the sensitivity of investment to q; Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2006) provide a similar result for ‡otation costs of equity. 11 The optimal policy in (9) also shows that binding collateral constraints (' > 0) induce underinvestment. In the extreme case where …rms are always constrained to binding collateral constraints (' > 0 8t), I show in the Appendix that the optimal investment policy is given by
such that both binding collateral and dividend constraints dampen the sensitivity of investment to q. Binding …nancing frictions also induce underinvestment by shifting the optimal inaction region for positive investment to higher values of q 2 : This is illustrated in Figure 2 . Binding …nancing constraints a¤ect the cut-o¤ values that determine the optimal inaction region of 1 0 See Appendix. I derive the cut-o¤ values for the optimal inaction region when …rms are also subject to …nancing constraints; the case described by Abel and Eberly (2004) is obtained when ' = 0; = 0 and m = 1.
1 1 The shadow cost of dividend constraints in the model is the shadow cost of equity …nancing when v = 0:
The …rst order condition for positive equity issues implies m + ' 1 + Hx: See Section 2.3.
investment. I show in the Appendix that the relevant cut-o¤ values of the optimal inertia region satisfy
for i = 1; 2 where q 1 < 0 is the upper bound for asset sales and q 2 > 0 is the lower bound for investment. Equation (11) shows that …nancing frictions a¤ect the optimal inertia region of investment in alternative ways. Firms subject to binding collateral constraints postpone investment to higher values of q 2 > 0 and initiate disinvestment at a higher q 1 < 0 relative to the …nancing frictionless case by Abel and Eberly (1994) . Binding collateral constraints increase the price of purchasing and selling capital; this induces …rms to postpone investment to a higher positive marginal q and to initiate disinvestment at a higher negative marginal q. Meanwhile, …rms subject to binding dividend constraints, personal and capital taxes postpone investment to higher values of q 2 > 0 if the shadow cost of collateral constraints is su¢ ciently low; and initiate asset sales at a lower cut-o¤ value q 1 < 0 of the marginal product of capital. 12 Figure 2 illustrates that these frictions widen the optimal inertia region in a similar fashion than an increase in the real …xed costs of investment.
The empirical literature on Q-theory has typically interpreted the inverse of the coef…cient on Q as the curvature of adjustment costs of investment . Expressions (9)- (11) predict that such inference is biased if the estimation fails to account for the e¤ect of real and …nancing frictions on investment. All else equal, …nancing frictions increase the implied curvature of adjustment costs and dampen the sensitivity of marginal q to investment. Furthermore, in the presence of …xed costs, the sensitivity of investment to marginal q reduces to zero. Expressions (9)- (11) thus rationalize the high variability of point estimates for the curvature of adjustment costs in the macro literature on Q-theory. Using the Q-theoretic approach, estimates for the curvature of adjustment costs range from over 20 (Hayashi, 1982) to as low as 3 (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995).
Optimal Financing Policies
Consider the optimal debt …nancing policy. The shadow cost of debt …nancing S B < 0 equates the marginal …nancing bene…t of issuing debt to the corresponding marginal costs. The optimal debt …nancing policy then satis…es
Binding dividend constraints dampen the sensitivity of debt issues to the shadow cost of debt …nancing. Fixed costs of investment jointly with binding collateral constraints create lumpiness in the optimal debt policy.
The optimal policy in (12) shows that binding collateral constraints and …xed costs of investment jointly create lumpiness in debt …nancing policies. When the …rm is in its inaction region of investment and is also subject to binding collateral constraints, the optimal …nancing policy is lumpy even in the absence of …xed costs of debt …nancing. Binding debt covenants may subordinate the optimal debt …nancing policy to investment; in particular, the binding constraint dB = dK implies b = I +rB K. A …rm subject to binding collateral constraints may …nd it optimal not to increase its book leverage by more than rB K when the …rm is in its inaction region of investment. This rate ensures that the credit line balance is kept constant after both repaying interest expenses and repurchasing debt to control for the depreciation of collateral. 13 Finally, consider equity issuing policies. The optimal external equity issuance policy of the …rm is given by
Hx and = 0 0 otherwise (13) at any point in time. While the model does not incorporate …xed costs of equity …nancing explicitly for the sake of tractability, the optimal equity issuance policy is still lumpy and depends primarily on the payout policy of the …rm and the constraint on share repurchases (Hayashi, 1985; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hennessy and Whited, 2005) . The optimal policy in (13) shows that binding …nancing frictions induce multiple regimes in equity issues. When dividends constraints are binding ( > 0) and share repurchases are not binding (v = 0), …rms optimally issue equity. This corresponds to the case where …rms exhaust their net revenue to …nance all the investment, and optimally issue shares to …nance a higher level of investment. The optimal policy may also be not to issue any equity (v > 0). 1 3 Notice that the empirical evidence suggests that r < 0:1, This may correspond to two alternative situations. If = 0; …rms have su¢ cient net internal resources to …nance investment and distribute dividends to shareholders. If > 0; …rms generate insu¢ cient revenue to …nance all investment opportunities, but face high ‡otation costs of equity that prevent them from issuing new shares. Firms subject to simultaneously binding dividend and share repurchasing constraints are …nancially constrained.
3 Testing Q-theory on Corporate Policies
Empirical Approach
Section 2 characterizes the optimal investment, debt …nancing and equity …nancing policies of the …rm as a function of …rm characteristics. In a nutshell, the model predicts that binding …nancing constraints reduce the responsiveness of investment to q. Binding …nanc-ing constraints also decrease the responsiveness of the optimal debt and equity …nancing to their corresponding shadow costs. Fixed costs of investment create optimal inaction regions in investment, which shift with binding collateral and dividend constraints. The optimal …nancing policies are also lumpy due to both the lumpiness in investment policies and binding …nancing constraints.
The goal of this Section is to estimate the investment and …nancing policies of …rms as derived in Section 2 and assess whether real and …nancing frictions are economically signi…cant. The empirical approach to estimate all corporate policies is based on the generalized instrumental variable estimators proposed by and Hansen and Singleton (1982) . An attractive feature of this method is that the parameters of the …rst order condition on investment are estimated without explicitly solving for the structural relation between investment and …nancing.
The empirical approach builds on two main observations. First, …nancing frictions create endogeneity between investment and …nancing. To control for the endogeneity between investment and …nancing, I use all lagged explanatory variables in each of the …rst order conditions for investment and …nancing in line with and Hansen and Singleton (1982) . Second, …xed costs of investment and binding …nancing frictions create non-linearity of all corporate policies with respect to Q. To control for these non-linearities, I sort observations in quantiles to identify the alternative regimes in all corporate policies derived in Section 2. I provide further details on the estimation below.
There have been other approaches di¤erent from the one in this paper to control for the impact of either real or …nancing frictions on investment. Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) consider an all equity …nanced …rm and …nd that investment has a nonlinear relation with average Q: The estimation approach applies the technique developed by Hansen (1996) to test models where there are nuisance parameters that are not identi…ed under the null hypothesis; the nuisance parameters are the thresholds [q 1 ; q 2 ] discussed in Section 2. This paper contributes to Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) in two dimensions. First, I consider both …xed costs and …nancing frictions in the estimation of optimal investment policies. Second, I propose an estimation approach using sorts that controls for inaction regions without pre-setting a speci…c number of regimes.
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a single equation approach that estimates dynamic models consistently for short and unbalanced panels. The technique uses GMM and expresses investment either in di¤erences or by transforming all variables in terms of orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . Bond and Meghir (1994) use this approach to test the Euler condition for investment in a dynamic model of investment and …nanc-ing. While the empirical approach in this paper also uses linear GMM, I hereby test for optimal investment and …nancing policies in levels as a function of Q, and correct both for endogeneity and non-linearities in the data.
Finally, an alternative estimation technique is that proposed by Erickson and Whited (2000) who use non-linear GMM to control for measurement error in Q using higher order moments. While Erickson and Whited (2000) focus on measurement error as a potential explanation of the bad empirical performance of Q-theory, the model and the tests in this paper focus on the lack of consistency of empirical tests due to the endogeneity between investment and …nancing. 14 The sample has been drawn from the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT database, considering only the 1985-2005 period for US manufacturing …rms in SICs 2000-3999. The sample has been …ltered for missing data, or for observations where total assets, the gross capital stock or sales are either zero or negative. All …rms with less than …ve consecutive years of accounting data have been deleted from the sample. All variables have been winsorized to eliminate the e¤ect of extreme values in the estimation. Table 1 provides further details on database construction and the correspondence of the main variables in the database to those described by the model in Section 2. Table 2 provides the relevant sample statistics.
Testing Q-theory on Investment Policies
The optimal investment policy in (9) is a function of the marginal product of capital q and the shadow cost of debt …nancing S B which are unobservable. Denote average Q S+B K as the ratio of the market value of the …rm to its …xed assets. Using a similar approach as in Hennessy (2004) and Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2006), average Q overstates marginal q by incorporating the costs of binding …nancing frictions on equity such that
where is a function of the net present value of the ‡otation costs of equity issues, re ‡ects the net present value of the cost of dividend constraints, and R is the net present value of the shadow cost of collateral constraints on equity.
Using both the optimal investment policy in (9) and the alternative expression for marginal q given in (14) provides a testable implication for investment rates in the active region of investment, namely
where all empirical tests are done for positive investment I > 0. The testable implication in (15) characterizes the wedge between marginal q and average Q derived in (14) di¤erently. Equation (14) characterizes the wedge between marginal q and average Q by means of the shadow cost of future dividend constraints, the net present value of ‡otation costs, and the shadow cost of future binding debt covenants. The testable implication in (15) incorporates current equity issues and current dividend payments to reexpress the …rst two terms in terms of observables. I assess the shadow cost of binding constraints on …rms' capital structure later on by constraining the estimation to either low leveraged and high leveraged …rms. 15 Given the persistence of dividend payments, current dividend payments are taken as a proxy of future dividend payments to shareholders. Current equity issues are used a proxy of ‡otation costs of equity both today and in the future (i.e. listing fees, etc.). The ratio cash holdings to capital at the time of investment controls for the cash ‡ow policy of the …rm, which is overlooked in Section 2 and may shed light on …rms' …nancing prospects (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988 ; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004). 1 5 An earlier version of the model considered a dummy for highly levered …rms in the regression. However, the method by requires the use of lagged regressors and instruments; the use of a dummy for lagged high leverage though a¤ects the robustness of the J-tests. I therefore abstract from the term R K in the benchmark case and then group …rms according to book leverage in Table 7 .
I apply the GMM generalized instrumental approach to control for the endogeneity between investment and …nancing. I consider one lagged regressors as instruments in line with and Hansen and Singleton (1982) . I consider one lag for all regressors. I further incorporate lagged changes in working capital to capital ratios and lagged changes in retained earnings to capital ratios as additional instruments for the past …nancing decisions of the …rm. Both the lagged change in retained earnings and the lagged change in working capital contribute to the estimation of investment policies as suggested by C-tests in untabulated results. 16 I also include year dummies and industry dummies using the 17-industry groups by Fama and French, and cluster data by …rm history. 17 I further control for non-linearities between investment and Q by estimating Equation (15) in quantiles. The sorting criterion stems directly from the model and is intended to identify the inaction region [q 1 ; q 2 ] by sampling the data in quantiles according to their implied marginal q: The unobservable marginal q is restated in terms of average Q and other …nancing variables using (14) . To isolate the impact of …nancing on marginal q, the working assumption is that marginal q can be re-expressed as a function of both the market to book equity ratio of the …rm and an additional variable that re ‡ects net funding resources of the …rm before investment. I therefore apply a double sort on market to book and to control for non-linearities in investment policies. All tests consider a maximum 5 quantiles by sort; a higher number of quantiles does not a¤ect results as demonstrated in the robustness checks below.
The sorting variable is constructed using the budget constraint such that
where denotes cash ‡ows. The budget constraint systematically links investment to …nancing decisions irrespective of whether the …rm is actively investing or re…nancing. Whenever > 0, the …rm has available resources to invest; conversely, 0 implies that the …rm may be constrained to invest. Table 1 suggests that 0 identi…es …rms that are constrained to invest. When 0 (Panel B), …rms are smaller in size, have a lower Q, and issue both less equity and less debt than all …rms on average (Panel A). 1 6 I have checked the marginal contribution of each of these instruments to all GMM estimations in the paper using C-tests or GMM distance tests. The null that these additional orthogonality conditions are actually satis…ed holds at the 5% level for almost all quantiles and estimations in the paper. The exception is the GMM estimation in Table 5 with …rms with negative net funding resources; then the lagged change in retained earnings is rejected by C-tests and therefore not included as an instrument. 1 7 The 17-industry group de…nitions are provided in Kenneth French's website. Controlling for heterogeneity without clustering by …rm yields similar results to those reported in Tables 3-14. Tables 3 7 describe the estimation results for (15) using generalized linear GMM with sorts. The model in Equation (15) is identi…ed and check if both the order condition and the rank condition of the system hold in all quantiles. J-tests of overidentying restrictions test relate to the order condition that requires a higher number of instruments than endogenous regressors. The joint null hypothesis of J-tests is that all instruments are valid instruments; a rejection of this hypothesis casts doubt on the validity of the model. 18 A-tests relate to the rank condition of the system and test whether instruments are e¤ectively correlated with the endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis of A-tests is that the correlations between the instruments and the endogenous regressors are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero; a rejection of this hypothesis ensures that the model is identi…ed. 19 The model is identi…ed if the estimation results simultaneously reject A-tests and fail to reject J-tests.
Consider …rst the testable predictions related to …xed costs of investment. Controlling for …nancing frictions, the model predicts that …xed costs of investment create an optimal inaction region in which the coe¢ cient 11 is zero. Outside this region, the coe¢ cient 11 should be positive and signi…cant. Table 3 shows the estimation results of using linear GMM and sorting the working sample into quantiles with market to book equity as the single sorting criterion. Results complement the empirical evidence by Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) and support the observation that …xed costs create non-linearities in investment. 20 In particular, the coe¢ cient on Q is only signi…cant when market to book equity ratios are larger than 2. 21 This suggests the existence of optimal inertia regions of investment for low market to book equity ratios. Interest expenses, debt issues, equity issues and cash holdings are also signi…cant in explaining investment.
Consider now the implications for …nancing frictions. When …rms are actively investing, the model predicts that …nancing frictions dampen the sensitivity of investment to Q. Firms with binding …nancing constraints or higher costs of …nancing (i.e. < 0) should have lower coe¢ cients on Q when actively investing. The model also predicts that binding collateral constraints and dividend constraints enlarge the inertia region for positive investment, such that q 2 > 0 increases for …nancially constrained …rms. Table 4 sorts observations into quantiles of market to book equity and constrains the sample to …rms with positive net 1 8 Under the null, the J-test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. See Hayashi (2000, pp. 227-228, 407, and 417). 1 9 The A-test is a generalization of the Anderson canonical correlations rank statistic to the non-i. funding resources. Results provide strong evidence that unconstrained …rms have higher coe¢ cients on Q than all …rms on average as reported in Table 3 . Table 5 then constrains the estimation in Table 3 to …rms with negative net funding resources. Consistent with the model, the inertia region expands to higher market to book ratios, and the coe¢ cients on average Q in those quantiles are lower than those observed in Tables 3 and 4 . J-tests and A-tests suggest that the model is identi…ed when …rms are actively investing. Table 6 complements Tables 3 5 and shows the estimation results of applying the linear GMM and using …rms'net funding resources as the single sorting criterion. This sorting criterion does not identify an inaction region in investment; the coe¢ cients on Q are signi…cant in all quantiles. These …ndings suggest that the sort on market to book equity ratios controls for inaction regions in investment; meanwhile, the sort on controls for the impact of …nancing on marginal q. Results also suggest that the model is identi…ed only if the estimation controls for non-linearities in investment with market to book sorts; J-tests and A-tests con…rm the goodness of …t of the model only for …rms with positive net funding resources. The empirical evidence shows a quadratic relation between the coe¢ cient on Q and ; this supports the assumption of convex costs of …nancing in Section 2. Furthermore, cash holdings are negatively related to investment when < 0 and positively related to investment when > 0: This supports the prediction that …rms anticipating future …nancing constraints may have incentives to hoard cash and short term investments today. 22 Concerning equity related constraints, the model predicts that …rms with no dividend distributions and no issuance activity have a lower coe¢ cient in Q. Panel A of Table 7 sorts the sample by market to book equity and constrains observations to non-dividend paying and (simultaneously) non-equity-issuing …rms in all quantiles. Results for both sorted and unsorted observations show that average Q is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero; A-tests reject that the rank condition holds in the model for most market to book quantiles and the model is only identi…ed in the unsorted estimation. Concerning collateral constraints on debt …nancing, the model predicts that …rms with high book leverage that are constrained in their leverage policy have coe¢ cient on Q that is either low or not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Panel B in Table 7 sorts the sample by market to book equity and constrains observations to highly levered …rms (i.e. B K > 0:6). The coe¢ cients on Q are not signi…cant and model is rejected by either J-tests and/or A-tests.
Overall, Tables 3 7 provide an explanation for the high variability of point estimates for the curvature of adjustment costs in the empirical literature on Q-theory. All signi…cant coe¢ cients other than 11 in Tables 3 7 are in line with the predictions of the model except for net debt issues, which are signi…cantly and positively related to investment. The sorting criterion on market to book commonly used in the investment asset pricing literature hereby controls for non-linearities in investment policies.
Testing Q-theory on Financing Policies
Consider …rst the case of debt …nancing policies. Using both Equation (14) and (12), the testable implication for the optimal debt policy if …rms are in there active region of investment and are not subject to collateral constraints is given by
where all empirical tests are done for net increases in long term debt b > 0. 23 When …rms are not subject to collateral constraints and are actively investing, the optimal debt …nancing policy is positively related to average Q such that 11 > 0. The optimal debt …nancing policy is insensitive to Q otherwise such that 11 is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The coe¢ cient 14 is signi…cant only if the …rm is actively investing irrespective of whether collateral constraints are binding. The reminder of the coe¢ cients are signi…cant when the …rm is actively investing and is not constrained in its debt policy. I estimate (16) using a similar approach as that of investment policies. I apply a double sort on S K B and B K to control for non-linearities in positive debt issues. The sort on market to book equity controls for inaction regions in investment policies. The underlying assumption is that average Q is a good proxy for marginal q when controlling for the impact of real frictions on investment. 24 The sort on book leverage B K controls whether the …rm is subject to binding collateral constraints as predicted by the model. The underlying assumption is that highly levered …rms are more likely to be constrained in increasing their book leverage ratio.
Tables 8 9 provide the empirical estimations of Equation (16). Consistent with the predictions of the model, Table 8 shows that optimal debt policies are positively and signi…cantly related to average Q in the region where …rms are actively investing according to Tables 3 5. Both J-tests and A-tests con…rm that the model is identi…ed for all quantiles; this is also the case for the unsorted estimation. Results in Table 9 further suggest that the testable implication in Equation (16) only holds when …rms are not constrained in their capital structure decisions. In Panel A (lower leverage), the model is accepted when market 2 3 Reductions in long term leverage are less likely in ‡uenced by an investment motive, and most probably in ‡uenced by distress concerns or agency costs not explicitly addressed in Section 2. 2 4 See Tables 3 6. to book ratios are su¢ ciently high and …rms are actively investing. As an exception, the model is also accepted by J-tests and A-tests for the lowest quantile of market to book ratios where …rms are not investing. In Panel B (higher leverage), the coe¢ cients on Q are insigni…cant and A-tests suggest that the model is not identi…ed with the exception of the highest quantile on market to book. The coe¢ cient on average Q is also insigni…cant in the unsorted estimation.
Consider now the case of equity …nancing policies. While (13) does not provide an explicit expression for x as a function of Q, the model requires that the …rm pays no dividends when issuing equity. If marginal investment is …nanced with new equity funding, then x is positively related to Q. Using (8) and considering D t = 0, equity issues are positively related to investment and negatively related to debt issues. Reordering terms in Equation (15), a testable empirical implication for net equity issues is given by
where all empirical tests are done for positive net equity issues x > 0. 25 The optimal equity …nancing policy is also lumpy and non-linear in Q. Given that all tests are done for positive equity issues, the observed non-linearities in Q should come from the lumpiness in investment policies. Nonetheless, the working assumption in the model that positive dividend distributions and equity issues are perfectly negatively correlated should not necessarily hold in the data. I thus estimate (17) using a double sort on market to book equity and dividends to control for non-linearities in equity issues. The sort on market to book controls for inaction regions in investment policies. Discriminating among …rms with positive payouts or no payouts further controls for the interaction between payout policies and equity issues.
Controlling for the payout policy of the …rm and real frictions on investment, the model predicts that net equity issues are positively and signi…cantly related to average Q such that 11 > 0: However, if …rms are in their optimal inertia region of investment, the lumpiness in optimal investment policies might a¤ect coe¢ cients 11 and 16 : Tables 10 11 provide the empirical results of estimating Equation (17) . In Table 10 , the coe¢ cients on Q are signi…cant for the higher market to book equity ratios where …rms are actively investing according to . This suggests that …xed costs of investment induce lumpiness in equity issues, even if the cut-o¤ of value for the inaction region in equity is higher than the one for investment observed in Table 3 . Interestingly, market to book ratios in equity issuing …rms are higher than those observed for investment and debt …nancing; the range of average market to book ratios in equity issues goes from 0:86 to 5:08 (compared to 0:73 to 4:65 in debt issues).
Consistent with the assumptions of the model, Table 11 further demonstrates that the relation between equity issues and average Q holds when equity issues are negatively related to dividend distributions. When …rms are not distributing dividends (Panel A) and issuing shares, the model is accepted for the same quantiles that are accepted in Table  10 . Conversely, when …rms show positive dividend distributions (Panel B), the model is identi…ed according to A-tests and the coe¢ cients on Q are not signi…cant in all quantiles. Results also show that the sensitivity of equity issues to Q is higher for …rms that are not distributing dividends (Panel A of Table 11 ) than for all …rms on average ( Table 10 ).
Robustness checks
The estimation approach throughout the paper is based in two fundamental observations. First, …nancing frictions create endogeneity between investment and …nancing policies. Second, both real and …nancing frictions create lumpiness in corporate policies. Tables 12 and 13 consider two di¤erent robustness checks that suggest that both instruments and sorts are economically signi…cant for corporate policies. Table 12 compares the OLS estimation results to the corresponding GMM estimation for all corporate policies without using sorts. This is a robustness check on the existence of endogeneity between investment and …nancing. Average Q is signi…cant for all cases; the use of instruments may change the sign and increases the magnitude of signi…cant coe¢ cients on average Q in all cases. The Hausman test (H-pval) on unclustered data shows that the GMM estimation is consistent, assuming that the model is correctly speci…ed. The endogeneity between investment and …nancing is further demonstrated by the fact that both debt and equity issues are signi…cantly related to average Q in the sample irrespective of the empirical approach. Table 13 estimates investment policies using OLS and market to book sorts only. The comparison with Table 3 constitutes a robustness check to assess the relative magnitude of endogeneity vis a vis non-linearities in investment policies. In Panel A, inaction regions in investment also show when applying OLS to sorted data; still, the coe¢ cients on Q are signi…cantly lower. The coe¢ cient on Q is also signi…cant for the lowest quantile on market to book, where the GMM tests suggest insigni…cancy. When the sample in Panel A is constrained to …rms with positive net funding resources, the coe¢ cients on Q in the active region are either equal or lower than those for all …rms on average; this also holds for unsorted data and is at odds with the predictions of the model.
As a complementary robustness check, Table 14 considers the use of a higher number of quantiles in the estimation of investment policies. Panel A considers GMM estimation with market to book sorts. Results are comparable to those in Table 3 ; the implied cut-o¤ value for the inertia region for all …rms on average is a market to book equity ratio of 2. J-tests and A-tests suggest that the model is identi…ed in the active region of investment. Panel B constrains the estimation to …rms with positive net funding resources. As in Table  4 , the inertia region shrinks to higher market to book ratios. As a caveat, some A-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
Asset pricing implications 4.1 An extension of the basic model
The neoclassical investment model described in Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Eberly (1994) for all equity …nanced …rms links stock returns to …rm characteristics. This was noted by Restoy and Rockinger (1990) and Cochrane (1991 Cochrane ( , 1996 in a production based set-up. I hereby introduce an exogenous stochastic discount factor to assess the impact of both real and …nancing frictions on stock returns. 26 Assume that the gross operating pro…ts of the …rm are both a¤ected by both idiosyncratic shocks t and undiversi…able aggregate shocks z t such that F (K t ; z t ; t ). Furthermore, assume that the …rm is subject to a stochastic discount factor such that
where r stands the for short run risk free rate of the market. Since the …rm is subject to a single source of aggregate risk by Equation (18), the asset pricing implications of the model predict that conditional CAPM holds once controlling for the …rm characteristics. Denote the market beta of equity by = zSz S . Using equation (14), it is then possible to derive expressions for equity market betas, namely
Equation (19) re ‡ects the underlying determinants of market betas. In particular, market betas are jointly a¤ected by the investment and …nancing policies undertaken by the …rm.
The contribution of each of these policies to the market beta depends on whether …nancing constraints are binding or not. Overall, …nancing constraints reduce …rm value and increase market betas. Equation (19) thus provides an alternative testable implication for the impact of …nancing frictions on …rm value. While (19) provides an insight as to the fundamentals a¤ecting equity betas, it does not provide a testable implication for stock returns. Consider now the reduced form expression for stock equity returns such that R e S r t + (S) ; where the risk premium on equity (S) is given by cov(dS t ; dz t ). An alternative expression of stock returns can be obtained directly from the Bellman equation of (7), namely
Equation (20) predicts that stock returns are positively related to earnings to price ratios; negatively related to net equity issues due to dilution; positively related to market to book for positive net increases in capital; negatively related to changes in leverage; positively related to a market premium for aggregate risk; and positively related to a premium on idiosyncratic risk. These predictions are consistent with most empirical studies on the cross section of stock returns (Fama and French (1992 , 1993 , 1997 ), as well as with theoretical models discussing these regularities (Cochrane (1991), Berk et al (1999) ). The negative relation between changes current leverage and stock returns is in line with Welch (2004) and Zhang et al (2005) .
Most importantly, Equation (20) highlights that in the presence of …xed costs of investment and other frictions, the responsiveness of stock returns to market to book is non-linear. Consider …rst the frictionless case by Abel and Eberly (1994) where marginal q equals market to book. Equation (20) can then be re-expressed as a function of the rewards to investment (q; K) = (q 1)I G(I; K) such that
where the optimal investment policy ensures that (q; K) is positive when the …rm is actively investing and zero in the inertia region. Consider now the case with …nancing frictions. While it is not longer true that marginal q equals market to book (see (14) ), the same intuition applies. The optimal investment policy with …xed costs implies that stock returns are non-linear in market to book; furthermore, this non-linearity is time-varying since …nancing frictions a¤ect the optimal inertia regions in investment policies as observed in Figure 2 .
The main observations concerning the e¤ect of real and …nancing frictions on corporate policies then translate into stock returns. In the presence of …nancing frictions, the returns to investment are endogenously related to the returns to …nancing. Furthermore, the lumpiness in investment policies due to …xed costs of investment results in non-linearity between stock returns and market to book ratios. In the empirical estimation of stock returns, the …rst observation requires the use of instruments to control for the changing …nancing costs of funding investment opportunities. The second observation requires the use of sorts to control for the impact of inertia regions of investment on stock returns.
Why has the model worked for stock returns?
Both Cochrane (1991) and Restoy and Rockinger (1994) show that stock returns and investment returns are analogous in a frictionless environment with quadratic adjustment costs of investment. Using this identity, Cochrane (1991 Cochrane ( , 1996 and more recently Liu, Whited and Zhang (2007) have documented that investment based asset pricing performs well in explaining stock returns. As a key feature, these models give no substantive role for …nancing; still, the conditional estimation usually controls for term premia, default premia and dividend yields. Recent models by Gomes Yaron and Zhang (2002), Obreja (2006) and Gomes and Schmid (2007) provide more re…ned dynamic investment models to assess the role of …nancing frictions on stock returns. Nonetheless, the standard estimation of investment asset pricing models with no distinct role for capital structure has been successful in explaining stock returns. A natural question that arises then is why the neoclassical frictionless investment model by Hayashi (1982) is successful in explaining stock returns and still has done a poor job in explaining investment data at both the aggregate and …rm level. Cochrane (1991) provides potential answers to this question. First, he suggests that the potential measurement error in Q arising in investment policies may be attenuated when working with stock returns at a higher frequency. Second, he suggests that models expressed as relations between returns can better capture …rm's responses to time varying risk premia. This paper provides an alternative reason why Q-theory has historically performed better for stock returns, based on the impact of real and …nancing frictions on …rms' corporate policies. This paper suggests that the estimated sensitivity of investment rates to Q is biased if the empirical approach fails to account for the e¤ect of real and …nancing frictions on investment. The fact that coe¢ cients on average Q have been typically low or insigni…cant surveyed by Caballero (1997) could be attributed to the biased estimation approach in empirical Q-theory, which has neglected the e¤ect of frictions on the sensitivity of investment to Q. Meanwhile, the standard empirical approach in the investment based asset pricing literature has used both instruments and sorts, naturally controlling for the impact of real and …nancing frictions on stock returns.
The usual conditional estimation for stock returns has used default premia, dividend yields, term premia and the short term interest rate as instruments (see Fama and French, 1989; Ferson and Harvey, 1991) . I consider these variables as natural instruments to control for the interaction between investment returns and the related costs of funding investment opportunities.
The empirical approach in investment based asset pricing also applies market to book and size sorts to ease the dimensionality problem of portfolio analysis (see Cochrane, 1991; Liu, Whited and Zhang, 2007) . This paper demonstrates that …xed costs of investment create non-linearities between investment and marginal q, and that sorts by market to book control for this e¤ect. Equation (21) also shows that the lumpiness in investment policies induces non-linearity between stock returns and market to book. This suggests market to book sorts as a useful tool to control for non-linearities in both investment and stock returns data. Market to book sorts are proposed by French (1992, 1993) in the empirical asset pricing literature. The paper then suggests that the usual sorts considered in the empirical asset pricing literature have economic content.
Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical approach to test the role of real and …nancing frictions on the investment, debt …nancing and equity …nancing policies of the …rm. Due to the existence of …nancing frictions, the model provides testable implications for investment policies and also for …nancing policies as a function of average Q. Due to real and …nancing frictions, the sensitivity of optimal policies to Q is highly non-linear. The model contributes in showing that binding collateral constraints propagate lumpiness between investment and debt …nancing, and predicts that inertia regions of investment shift due to binding …nancing constraints.
The paper provides a simple empirical approach to control for both the endogeneity and non linearities created by real and …nancing frictions. The generalized linear approach by and Hansen and Singleton (1982) controls for endogeneity in all corporate policies. The use of sorts on market to book a la French (1992, 1993 ) controls for non-linearities in investment. The budget constraint of the …rm controls for the impact of …nancing resources on investment. The paper then suggests that the use of sorts in the investment based asset pricing literature has economic content.
Finally, there has been little questioning as to why the Q-theory of investment model is successful in explaining stock returns but not investment policies. The current paper derives a stylized dynamic set-up to answer this question and provides supporting empirical evidence that …nancing frictions (i) create endogeneity between investment and …nancing and (ii) generate non linearity between investment rates and Q. While the standard conditional approach in investment asset pricing models naturally controls for these features using both instruments and sorts, the empirical tests of Q-theory in levels have overlooked the joint e¤ect of real and …nancing frictions on corporate policies. 
De…ne the Dynkin's operator on a twice di¤erentiable function, say f , as
Consider the solution for the marginal cost of capital q. Di¤erentiating with respect to K and using the operator A then yields
Using (6), D K can be rewritten as
The optimality conditions on I, b and x are given by
Replacing by the optimality conditions in equation (22) and using D K , it then holds that
Multiplying by K, using the fact A(q)K k q A(qK) Iq and invoking homogeneity of F and G yields
where the complementarity slackness conditions on N and vD hold pointwise. The Bellman equation for S can be written in a symmetric form as
Substracting and rearranging terms,
Using the properties of H, it holds that H 0 (x) x = 2H (x). Then given the …rst order condition for equity issues, equation (24) can be re-expressed as
Consider now the marginal cost of debt …nancing S B . Applying the same approach as for q, it holds that
Finally, adding (24) and (25) 
yields the Euler equation for S such that
A(S qK S B B) r(S qK S
Using Dynkin's formula and assuming the no bubble condition on …rm value, the expression above yields
where t re ‡ects the shadow cost of the non-negativity constraints on equity value
and t is the net present value of equity ‡otation costs, namely
and R t re ‡ects the shadow cost of collateral constraints on equity value, namely
Binding collateral constraints
Consider now the extreme case of ' > 0 8t where the collateral constraint is always binding such that dB = dK for all periods. The binding collateral constraint on debt implies b = (I + (r ) K) and, due to the initial condition, it also holds that B = K: The stock of debt of the …rm is now proportional to the stock of capital and thus value function of the manager S(K; ) does not depend on B. The optimality conditions with respect to K is given by
such that the binding debt covenants extend the adjustment costs of investment to which the …rm is subject to. Reordering terms in (26), the optimality condition of investment is
such that both non-negativity constraints and debt covenants dampen the sensitivity of the investment capital ratio to marginal q. Using the same approach as for the cases of non-binding collateral constraints, the expression for …rm value is given by
Average Q overstates marginal q by the shadow cost of share repurchase constraints and ‡otation costs. The additional term related to the shadow cost of debt issuance disappears because the …rm has lost its ability to decide on its optimal debt …nancing policy; all variables related to debt …nancing can be restated in terms of capital and investment. Note that equation (28) would be the same for an all-equity …nanced …rm subject to nonnegativity constraints and ‡otation costs of equity.
The inaction region of investment
In line with Abel and Eberly (1994), …rms only invest when the maximand (q; K) = (q (m + + ' )) I (m + ) G (I; K) is greater than zero. The inaction region of investment is thus given by q 2 [q 1 ; q 2 ] where q i i = 1; 2 are the roots of the maximand (q; K) :
The roots of the maximand depend on the shadow costs of …nancing and the …rm's …xed costs of investment. The optimality condition in the active region of investment is given by (9) and is such that it maximizes (q; K). Replacing by (9) in (q; K), dividing by K; and equating to zero yields
where f is the …xed cost of investment per unit of capital. The roots of (29) are then cut-o¤ values q 1 and q 2 of the optimal inaction region, and have the form
The case of Abel and Eberly (1994) with no wedge on the price of capital obtains for = 0; ' = 0 and m = 1, such that
for
The statement that …rms subject to binding collateral constraints ' > 0 postpone positive investment to higher values of q implies
Note that this is also true for q 1 such that …rms disinvest at a higher marginal product of capital. Consider now the proof that …rms subject to ‡otation costs of equity may postpone positive investment to higher values of q. The optimality condition for equity issues when
where I have used a …rst order approximation of the term (1 H x ) 1 : Then an increase in the ‡otation costs of equity also induces …rms to postpone investment since
The converse is true for the disinvestment cut-o¤ such that …rms with higher ‡otation costs postpone investment to a lower marginal product of capital. Finally, if the …xed costs of investment per unit of capital f are larger, the …rm also postpones investment to higher values since
The converse is true for q 1 such that inertia region increases for both investment and disinvestment. The sensitivity of investment to q in the active region of investment T h is ta b le illu stra te s th e im p a c t o f …n a n c in g fric tio n s o n th e d e riva tive o f o p tim a l inve stm e nt ra te s to m a rg in a l q . T h e so lid lin e c o rre sp o n d s to th e fric tio n le ss c a se (H aya sh i, 1 9 8 2 ), w h e re th e c u rva tu re o f a d ju stm e nt c o sts d o e s n o t ch a n g e w ith …n a n c in g . T h e d o tte d d a sh e d lin e a p p lie s to …rm s a re su b je c t to d iv id e n d c o n stra ints. K e e p in g b c o n sta nt, th e im p lie d se n sitiv ity o f inve stm e nt to q d e c re a se s w h e n x in c re a se s. G ive n th e o p tim a lity c o n d itio n s fo r e q u ity issu e s, th e se re su lts a lso a p p ly to th e im p a c t o f ‡o ta tio n c o sts o f e q u ity o n inve stm e nt p o lic ie s. T h e d a sh e d lin e c o rre sp o n d s to th e c a se w h e re …rm s a re a ¤e c te d by b in d in g c o lla te ra l c o n stra ints; ke e p in g x c o n sta nt, th e se n sitiv ity o f inve stm e nt ra te s is low e r th a n th e fric tio n le ss c a se . I ch o se th e c a se w h e re c o lla te ra l c o n stra ints a re p e rm a n e ntly b in d in g (E q u a tio n 1 0 ) fo r illu stra tive p u rp o se s. T h is …g u re illu stra te s a n a lte rn a tive ch a n n e l th ro u g h w h ich …n a n c in g fric tio n s in d u c e u nd e rinve stm e nt. F irm s o n ly inve st w h e n th e m a x im a n d (q; K) = [q (m + + ' )]I (m + )G(I; K) is g re a te r th a n z e ro . T h e ro o ts o f th e m a x im a n d q 1 a n d q 2 d e te rm in e th e in a c tio n re g io n o f inve stm e nt a n T h e d a ta b a se c o n sists o f p u b lic U S in d u stria l …rm s b e tw e e n 1 9 8 5 a n d 2 0 0 5 . P a n e l A p rov id e s th e ave ra g e sa m p le sta tistic s. P a n e l B su g g e sts th a t < 0 id e nti…e s …rm s th a t a re c o n stra in e d to inve st. W h e n < 0, …rm s a re sm a lle r in siz e , h ave low e r Q s, low e r inve stm e nt to c a p ita l ra tio s a n d issu e b o th le ss e q u ity a n d le ss d e b t th a n …rm s in P a n e l A . P a n e l C sh ow s th a t …rm s p ay in g n o d iv id e n d s a re sm a lle r in siz e , h ave h ig h e r Q s a n d h ig h e r c a sh h o ld in g s th a n th o se in P a n e l A . H ig h ly le ve re d …rm s (P a n e l D ) h ave low e r Q , low e r c a sh h o ld in g s a n d low e r inve stm e nt to c a p ita l ra tio s. 
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T h is ta b le sh ow s th e e stim a tio n re su lts fo r inve stm e nt u sin g g e n e ra liz e d lin e a r G M M in q u a ntile s so rte d by m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio s. In stru m e nts in c lu d e a ll la g g e d re g re sso rs, th e la g g e d ch a n g e s in re ta in e d e a rn in g s, th e la g g e d ch a n g e s in w o rk in g c a p ita l, ye a r d u m m ie s a n d in d u stry d u m m ie s. O b se rva tio n s a re c lu ste re d by …rm h isto ry. E a ch q u a ntile is id e nti…e d by its ave ra g e m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio . R e su lts su p p o rt th e p re d ic tio n th a t th e re la tio n b e tw e e n inve stm e nt a n d Q is n o n -lin e a r. B o th J -te sts a n d A -te sts e n su re th a t th e m o d e l is id e nti…e d in a ll q u a ntile s. T h e c o e ¢ c ie nt o n Q is o n ly sig n i…c a nt w h e n m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio s la rg e r th a n 2 , w h e re 2 is th e low e r b o u n d o f th e fo u rth q u a ntile . T h is su g g e sts p o te ntia l in a c tio n re g io n s in inve stm e nt p o lic ie s. Inte re st e x p e n se s, d e b t issu e s, e q u ity issu e s a n d c a sh h o ld in g s p rove a ll to b e sig n i…c a nt in e x p la in in g inve stm e nt. for > 0 T h is e stim a tio n c o n stra in s th e sa m p le in Ta b le 3 to …rm s w ith p o sitive n e t fu n d in g re so u rc e s. R e su lts sh ow th a t …rm s w h ich a re u n c o n stra in e d to inve st h ave h ig h e r c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q . Fu rth e rm o re , th e in a c tio n re g io n o b se rve d in Ta b le 3 sh rin k s to low e r m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio s. J -te sts a n d A -te sts e n su re th e g o o d n e ss o f …t o f th e m o d e l; a s a n e x c e p tio n , th e m o d e l is n o t id e nti…e d fo r th e …rst q u a ntile o f m a rke t to b o o k . Inte re st e x p e n se s, d e b t issu e s, e q u ity issu e s a n d c a sh h o ld in g s a re sig n i…c a nt in e x p la in in g inve stm e nt. T h e ave ra g e inve stm e nt ra te s a n d …rm siz e in a ll q u a ntile s a re h ig h e r th a n th o se o b se rve d in Ta for < 0 T h is e stim a tio n c o n stra in s th e sa m p le in Ta b le 3 to …rm s w ith n e g a tive n e t fu n d in g re so u rc e s. In stru m e nts in c lu d e a ll la g g e d re g re sso rs, ye a r d u m m ie s, in d u stry d u m m ie s, a n d la g g e d ch a n g e s in w o rk in g c a p ita l; th e la g g e d ch a n g e s in re ta in e d e a rn in g s d o n o t c o ntrib u te to th e e stim a tio n a n d a re n o t in c lu d e d . R e su lts sh ow th a t …rm s w h ich a re c o n stra in e d to inve st h ave low e r c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q th a n …rm s in Ta b le s 3 a n d 4 . Fu rth e rm o re , th e in a c tio n re g io n is la rg e r th a n th a t o b se rve d in Ta b le 4 fo r …rm s w ith p o sitive n e t fu n d in g . J -te sts a n d A -te sts e n su re th e g o o d n e ss o f …t o f th e m o d e l in th e h ig h e r q u a ntile s w h e re …rm s a re a c tive ly inve stin g . T h e m o d e l is re je c te d o n ave ra g e in th e a b se n c e o f m a rke t to b o o k so rts. Inte re st e x p e n se s, d e b t issu e s, e q u ity issu e s a n d c a sh h o ld in g s a re sig n i…c a nt in e x p la in in g inve stm e nt. T h e ave ra g e inve stm e nt ra te s a n d …rm siz e in a ll q u a ntile s a re low e r th a n th o se o b se rve d in Ta Table 6 : Investment Policies sorted on only T h is ta b le sh ow s th e e stim a tio n re su lts fo r inve stm e nt u sin g g e n e ra liz e d lin e a r G M M in q u a ntile s so rte d by , w h e re a low e r su g g e sts th a t …rm s a re c o nstra in e d to inve st. In stru m e nts in c lu d e a ll la g g e d re g re sso rs, la g g e d ch a n g e s in re ta in e d e a rn in g s, la g g e d ch a n g e s in w o rk in g c a p ita l, ye a r d u m m ie s a n d ind u stry d u m m ie s. E a ch q u a ntile is id e nti…e d by its c o rre sp o n d in g ave ra g e . R e su lts su g g e st a q u a d ra tic re la tio n b e tw e e n th e c o e ¢ c ie nt o n Q a n d ; th e e m p iric a l e v id e n c e su p p o rts th e a ssu m p tio n o f c o nve x c o sts o f …n a n c in g . T h e m o d e l fa ils to re je c t J -te sts o n ly w h e n …rm s h ave p o sitive n e t fu n d in g re so u rc e s. C a sh h o ld in g s a re n e g a tive ly re la te d to Q w h e n < 0 a n d p o sitive ly re la te d to Q w h e n > 0 . for D = 0 and x = 0, and B K > 0:6 P a n e l A c o n stra in s th e e stim a tio n o f inve stm e nt p o lic ie s in Ta b le 3 to …rm s th a t b o th issu e n o e q u ity a n d p ay n o d iv id e n d s. R e su lts su p p o rts th e p re d ic tio n th a t …rm s th a t a re n o t p ay in g d iv id e n d s a n d n o t issu in g e q u ity sh ow low e r (in sig n i…c a nt) c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q w ith re sp e c t to th o se in Ta b le 3 . J -te sts a n d A -te sts fu rth e r sh ow th a t th e m o d e l is n o t a c c u ra te to e x p la in th e inve stm e nt ra te s o f c o n stra in e d …rm s. P a n e l B su p p o rts th e p re d ic tio n th a t …rm s w ith h ig h b o o k le ve ra g e m ay b e c o n stra in e d in th e ir inve stm e nt p o lic ie s. T h e m o d e l is re je c te d by e ith e r J -te sts a n d / o r A -te sts. 
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T h is ta b le sh ow s th e re su lt o f e stim a tin g p o sitive d e b t issu e s th ro u g h g e n e ra liz e d lin e a r G M M in q u a ntile s so rte d by m a rke t to b o o k ra tio s. In stru m e nts inc lu d e a ll la g g e d re g re sso rs, la g g e d ch a n g e s in re ta in e d e a rn in g s, la g g e d ch a n g e s in w o rk in g c a p ita l, ye a r d u m m ie s a n d in d u stry d u m m ie s. A ll o b se rva tio n s a re c lu ste re d by …rm . E a ch q u a ntile is d e n o te d by its c o rre sp o n d in g ave ra g e m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio . R e su lts su g g e st th a t o p tim a l d e b t p o lic ie s a re sig n i…c a ntly re la te d to ave ra g e Q in th e re g io n w h e re …rm s a re a c tive ly inve stin g ; o th e rw ise th e m o d e l is re je c te d a n d d o e s n o t e x p la in p o sitive d e b t issu e s. R -te sts su g g e st th a t in stru m e nts a re va lid fo r a ll q u a ntile s. In P a n e l A (low e r le ve ra g e ), p o sitive d e b t issu e s a re sig n i…c a ntly re la te d to ave ra g e Q w h e n …rm s a re a c tive ly inve stin g . A s a n e x c e p tio n , th e m o d e l is a lso a c c e p te d fo r th e low e st q u a ntile o f m a rke t to b o o k , w h e re …rm s a re n o t a c tive ly inve stin g a c c o rd in g to Ta b le s 3 -5 . In P a n e l B (h ig h e r le ve ra g e ), th e m o d e l is u su a lly id e nti…e d e x c e p t fo r th e h ig h e st q u a ntile o n m a rke t to b o o k , a n d th e c o e ¢ c ie nt o n Q is a lw ay s in sig n i…c a nt. 
Variables
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T h is ta b le sh ow s th e re su lt o f e stim a tin g n e t e q u ity issu e s th ro u g h g e n e ra liz e d lin e a r G M M so rte d by m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio s. In stru m e nts in c lu d e a ll la g g e d re g re sso rs, la g g e d ch a n g e s in re ta in e d e a rn in g s, la g g e d ch a n g e s in w o rkin g c a p ita l, ye a r d u m m ie s a n d in d u stry d u m m ie s. E a ch q u a ntile is d e n o te d by its ave ra g e m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio . J -te sts re je c t th e m o d e l in th e lowe st q u a ntile o f m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio s. E q u ity issu e s a re p o sitive ly a n d sig n i…c a ntly re la te d to ave ra g e Q in th e a c tio n re g io n o f inve stm e nt a c c o rd in g to Ta b le 3 . Inve stm e nt to c a p ita l ra tio s, d iv id e n d p ay m e nts to sh a re h o ld e rs, d e b t issu e s a n d inte re st e x p e n se s a re a lso sig n i…c a nt in e x p la in in g e q u ity issu e s. T h e ra n g e o f ave ra g e m a rke t to b o o k ra tio s o f a ll q u a ntile s su g g e st th a t e q u ity issu in g …rm s h ave a h ig h e r m a rke t to b o o k ra tio th a n a ll …rm s o n ave ra g e . and D T h is ta b le sh ow s th e e stim a tio n o f p o sitive n e t e q u ity issu e s th ro u g h g e n e ra liz e d lin e a r G M M in q u a ntile s c o n d itio n a l o n p ayo u t p o lic ie s. Fo r th e sa ke o f b re v ity, o n ly c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q a n d te sts o n g o o d n e ss o f …t a re re p o rte d . In P a n e l A , (D = 0) th e m o d e l is a c c e p te d w h e n …rm s a re a c tive ly inve stin g a c c o rd in g to th e c u t-o ¤ va lu e s im p lie d by Ta b le 4 . T h e c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q a re h ig h e r th a n th o se in Ta b le 1 0 fo r th e sa m e q u a ntile s, su g g e stin g th a t …rm s th a t issu e e q u ity a n d d o n o t d istrib u te d iv id e n d s h ave a low e r c o st o f c a p ita l th a n th e ave ra g e sa m p le . J -te sts fa il to re je c t th e g o o d n e ss o f …t o f th e m o d e l in th e h ig h e r q u a ntile s; m e a nw h ile , A -te sts su g g e st th a t th e m o d e l is id e nti…e d o n ly a t th e 6 In P a n e l B (D > 0), th e m o d e l is re je c te d by A -te sts in a ll q u a ntile s b u t th e …rst, a n d th e c o e ¢ c ie nt o n Q is n o t sig n i…c a nt. T h e inve stm e nt b a se d e x p la n a tio n fo r e q u ity issu e s h o ld s w h e n d iv id e n d s a re n e g a tive ly c o rre la te d to e q u ity issu e s. T h is ta b le c o m p a re s th e O L S e stim a tio n re su lts o f c o rp o ra te p o lic ie s to th e G M M e stim a tio n d e sc rib e d in S e c tio n 3 . R e su lts su p p o rt th e p re d ic tio n th a t …n a n c in g fric tio n s c re a te e n d o g e n e ity b e tw e e n inve stm e nt a n d …n a n c in g p o lic ie s. A ve ra g e Q is sig n i…c a nt fo r a ll c a se s a n d re la te s p o sitive ly to a ll c o rp o ra te p o lic ie s. T h e u se o f in stru m e nts m ay ch a n g e th e sig n a n d in c re a se s th e m a g n itu d e o f sig n i…c a nt c o e ¢ c ie nts in a ll c a se s.
T h e H a u sm a n te st (H -pva l) o n u n c lu ste re d d a ta sh ow s th a t th e G M M e stim a tio n is c o n siste nt if th e m o d e l is c o rre c tly sp e c i…e d . T h is ta b le p rov id e s a n a d d itio n a l te st o f th e m a g n itu d e o f e n d o g e n e ity v is a v is n o n -lin e a ritie s in c o rp o ra te p o lic ie s. In P a n e l A , in a c tio n re g io n s in inve stm e nt still a p p e a r w h e n a p p ly in g O L S to so rte d d a ta ; still, th e c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q a re sig n i…c a ntly low e r a n d th e low e st q u a ntile o n m a rke t to b o o k is a lso sig n i…c a nt. P a n e l B c o n stra in s th e e stim a tio n to …rm s w ith p o sitive n e t fu n d in g re so u rc e s; th e im p lie d in a c tio n re g io n sh rin k s, ye t th e c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q a re sig n i…c a ntly low e r th a n th o se in Ta b le 4 . T h is ta b le re p o rts th e c o e ¢ c ie nts o n Q a n d g o o d n e ss o f …t in d ic a to rs fo r a ll q u a ntile s w h e n so rtin g inve stm e nt ra te s into 1 0 q u a ntile s o f m a rke t to b o o k . P a n e l A c o n sid e rs a ll o b se rva tio n s a n d sh ow s sim ila r re su lts to th o se in Ta b le 3 u sin g 5 q u a ntile s. T h e im p lie d a c tive re g io n o f inve stm e nt sta rts o n th e se ve nth q u a ntile , w h o se low e r b o u n d is a m a rke t to b o o k e q u ity ra tio o f 2 . B o th J -te sts a n d A -te sts c o n …rm th e g o o d n e ss o f …t o f th e m o d e l in th e a c tive re g io n ; a s a n e x c e p tio n , th e J -te st in th e la st q u a ntile o f m a rke t to b o o k is re je c te d a t th e 5 p e r c e nt le ve l. P a n e l B c o n stra in s th e e stim a tio n to …rm s w ith p o sitive n e t fu n d in g re so u rc e s. In lin e w ith re su lts in Ta b le 4 , th e in a c tio n re g io n sh rin k s fo r …rm s w ith p o sitive n e t fu n d in g re so u rc e s. J -te sts e n su re th e g o o d n e ss o f …t o f th e m o d e l in th e a c tive re g io n ; A -te sts h ow e ve r a re so m e tim e s re je c te d a t th e 5 p e r c e nt th re sh o ld . 
